			4	13 % agree	39,539	No.	_							
	b - can't just throw a niceness dataset and add corrigibility													
mhar	corrigibility name	section		domination	no newarful helpers	unlimited enacity	hetrougl in free	it is easier to go against humans than with	assumptions	no instrumental obstraction conversions	need to solve in unbounded computation scenario	we NEED to get into the dangerous territory	comments	
imber	only Eliezer Yudkowsky notices lethal difficulties	c overview of alignment		domination	no powerful helpers	unlimited opacity	betrayal is free	it is easier to go against humans than with	no bottlenecks in the environment	no instrumental abstraction convergence	need to solve in unbounded computation scenario	we NEED to get into the dangerous territory	comments	
1	39 notices lethal difficulties	as a field	?											0
	geniuses are non- 40 transferable	c overview of alignment as a field	?											0
	this document is not enough to make someone													
	a core alignment researcher. Eliezer Yudkowsky shouldn't be 41 the only one to make it													
	Yudkowsky shouldn't be	c overview of alignment												
4	41 the only one to make it	as a field c overview of alignment	?											0
4	42 there is no plan	as a field	?											0
	this world does not look as if it's going to suirvive													
	if it's going to suirvive. people don't find enough flaws in their own plans.													
	string theory was 43 overrated.	c overview of alignment as a field												
	does not generalize from	as a held	7											0
	safe to dangerous	b.1 distributional leap	2											
	drastic shift in distribution.								*					
	12 new options	b.1 distributional leap	?						x					1
	AGIs will inevitably coalesce into a signle	b.4 miscellaneous												
3	35 agent set against humanity	unworkable schemes a lethal problem that	?						×					1
	cannot build a weak	needs to be solved and on the first try	_											
		a lathal problem that		x										1
	need to prevent other 6 unaligned AGIs	needs to be solved and on the first try	2	*										1
		a lethal problem that		^										
		needs to be solved and on the first try	?	×										1
	we can't undestand its	b.4 miscellaneous												
:	36 strategy it needs to generalize to	unworkable schemes	?		x								the action of finding a strategy is more costly than validating it	1
	it needs to generalize to 11 build nanotechnology	b.1 distributional leap	no										STEM AI	0
		a lethal problem that needs to be solved and on the first try												
	3 right on the first try	the first try b.3 central difficulties of	no									x		1
	no idea what's inside matrices	useful transparency/ interpretability	no							x				1
		b.3 central difficulties of												
	we can't foresee all the	sufficiently good and useful transparency/												
2		interpretability b.3 central difficulties of	no		x									1
		sufficiently good and												
:	no pivotal output that is 30 humanly checkable		no		x									1
	cannot point to noumena	b.2 central difficulties of												
		outer and inner alignment b.2 central difficulties of	no							x			Paul Christiano abstractions graph	1
	17 unverifiable	outer and inner alignment	no			x	x							2
	independent bootstrapping of capabilities through any	a lethal problem that needs to be solved and on												
			no				x		×					2
	there is a time limit and competing actors - need to 4 go on	a lethal problem that needs to be solved and on the first try												
	4 go on	b.3 central difficulties of	no	x				x						2
		sufficiently good and												
2	humans cannot inspect 29 AGI output	interpretability	no		x	x								2
	knowing a medium etrenath is lethal won't help	h 3 central difficulties of												
	strength is lethal won't help upgrade it and fix it, to compete with a potential 26 stronger one	sufficiently good and												
	compete with a potential stronger one	interpretability	no						x		x		stoppage would happen and the teams would talk it out	2
		b.2 central difficulties of outer and inner alignment	00											2
	Lo mannan raters are bad	b.3 central difficulties of				^	^			^ _				3
	cannot verify behaviorally 31 to see if it's deceitful	sufficiently good and useful transparency/												
3	31 to see if it's deceitful	interpretability	no		x	x	x							3
	safe system would require maintenance, running a	a lethal problem that												
	maintenance, running a pivotal AGI is not passively 9 safe	needs to be solved and on the first try	ves											0
		a lethal problem that												
	alpha go self-learning 1 faster than a human	a lethal problem that needs to be solved and on the first try a lethal problem that	yes											0
	capability generalization	a lethal problem that												
	8 across domains	the first try												0
	new alignment problems at	b.1 distributional leap												0
	only evaluates lethal	oronoooliaricap	,											0
	only evaluates lethal options once sufficiently powerful	b.1 distributional leap	ves											0
	fast capability gains break alignment - humans as an													-
			yes											0
	outer optimizaiton not	b.2 central difficulties of												0
		outer and inner alignment b.2 central difficulties of												U
	18 no Cartesian ground truth	outer and inner alignment	yes											0
	Capabilities generalize further than alignment once capabilities start to													
			yes											0
	core structure for reasoning emergent in low- entropy high-structure environments, no such for alignment													
	reasoning emergent in low- entropy high-structure													
	environments, no such for	b.2 central difficulties of outer and inner alignment	ves											0
														-
3	corrigibility is unsolvable in	b.2 central difficulties of												-
3	corrigibility is unsolvable in	b.2 central difficulties of outer and inner alignment	yes											0

		43 % agree			39,539	%									
	b - can't just throw a niceness dataset and add corrigibility		1	7					assumptions						
number	name	section	do I agree	domination	no powerful helpers	unlimited opacity	betrayal is free	it is easier to go against humans than with	no bottlenecks in the environment	no instrumental abstraction convergence	need to solve in unbounded computation scenario	we NEED to get into the dangerous territory	comments		
2	optimizing for transparency optimized for unaligned 7 undetected thoughts	useful transparency/ interpretability	yes											(0
3	Al is alien and	b.3 central difficulties of sufficiently good and useful transparency/ interpretability	yes											c	0
3	most people are business 7 as usual sheeple	c overview of alignment as a field	yes												0
3	Al safety is not remotely productive. only easy problems are approached, 8 produces mostly noice		yes											c	0
3	human thoughts and abstractions are not AGI-		yes						x				STEM AI	1	1
3	humans can't join a conspiracy among AGIs. we can't reason about their 4 code		no		x	x	x							3	3
				4		6	5	5	1	6	3	1	1	5	